ldrews, on 2017-October-29, 18:56, said:
Wasn't Hillary Clinton one of nine members of the panel that gave final approval to the deal?
OK, one last post on this before clearing the way for Mueller -
some background to CFIUS from
someone in a position to know. I will pick out the highlights as quotes with some commentary:
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Based on what is currently in the public record, little, if anything about the allegation is plausible.
...which everyone knows of course but since the aim is to blow smoke over Mueller's investogation that is hardly relevant.
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Typically the commercial agencies (the Treasury Department, which chairs the committee, joined by the Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) will argue against most (and sometimes all) restrictions on the ability of parties to enter into contracts. They contend that such limitations make American companies less attractive to purchase and result in distortions of the market that fail to benefit American consumers. Usually, they are joined by the Department of State, which reaches the same conclusion from a different direction. State's concern is often that adverse action will disrupt foreign relations and might lead to reciprocal limitations being imposed by other nations.
In other words, the role of the DoS on the committee is primarily to protect foreign relations, whereas Defense and DHS are primarily charged with raising national security issues. In the case of uranium the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is also an important body that needs to approve the transaction. The specific case of Uranium One took place during the Russia "reset", so it would be natural to assume that the prevailing attitude amongst the DoS civil servants at the time would be favourable towards improving relations with Russia. It thus seems wholly in keeping with the process that this would be their line in inter-agency discussions without any need to refer the matter upwards to an under-secretary.
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One final point—the CFIUS process has been around for a while. Most of the cases are relatively routine. Mitigation measures are often standard, with a little bit of crafting to meet a specific case. A regular meeting has career civil servants in attendance, not political appointees. Political staff is engaged (typically at the assistant secretary or undersecretary level) only in rare cases and secretarial engagement is even less common—except, of course, when the issue is going to be presented to the president for his actual decision.
...which is the real crux of the matter. The committee work is done at a junior level and has been for a very long time. Any suggestion that this reflects negatively on the Secretaries involved is wholly misplaced.
And here is an excerpt from the NRC approval statement (my emphasis added in bold):
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NRC’s review of the transfer of control request determined that the U.S. subsidiaries will remain the licensees, will remain qualified to conduct the uranium recovery operations, and will continue to have the equipment, facilities, and procedures necessary to protect public health and safety and to minimize danger to life or property. The review also determined that the licensees will maintain adequate financial surety for eventual decommissioning of the sites. Neither Uranium One nor ARMZ holds an NRC export license, so no uranium produced at either facility may be exported.
And finally the summary:
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What can we glean from all this?
It is unlikely that Secretary Clinton personally participated in the transaction. Her assistant secretary says she did not intervene, and given the nature of the transaction and the apparent lack of controversy, that is a plausible scenario. I can see no reason to doubt his account.
The structure of CFIUS is such that no one agency can control the outcome of the consideration. Here it appears that the entire committee and the NRC were all satisfied with the mitigation put in place. It is a very far stretch to lay this result at State's doorstep—the vigorous objection of any of the security-minded agencies would likely have derailed the transaction, but none, evidently was forthcoming. I have no doubt that State favored the sale—but that is likely the position it would take today under Secretary Rex Tillerson and was surely the position it would have taken under Secretaries Colin Powell, Condoleeza Rice and John Kerry. State has a strong institutional bias in favor of accommodating foreign investment in the United States. Here, it seems clear that the Pentagon and DHS did not object either.
The inherent bias of the process is to approve transactions, with mitigation if needed. Intervention and blocking are rare and require more than a single agency to be activated. Put another way, no single agency has a veto on the transaction—the transaction goes forward unless a substantial majority of CFIUS is motivated by grave concerns to block it. So the most accurate way to characterize this case is that State, along with all the other agencies, declined to recommend a presidential veto.
Uranium One's licenses are for mining and extraction, not for export. This makes the claim that we "gave away" 20% of America's uranium fairly hyperbolic. The expectation, in light of the NRC's assessment, would have been that the uranium mined would be marketed in America (with the profits going to Russia).
It is, however, true, that the mining rights to 20% of American uranium are now held by a Russian state agency. That is troubling (and had it been me, I would have tried to generate opposition to the sale). It isn't a "give away," but it is the case that Rusatom has de jure and de facto legal rights that can be exercised to limit production if it wishes to do so.
You will note that he reaches the same conclusion as me, that the main concern here is the ability to limit American uranium production and that this should probably have been subjected to higher scrutiny. it also seems clear that the main line of blame for this, if there is any blame to assign, would be with the civil servants in DoD, DHS and NRC. The truth of the matter is that the sale was not seen as controversial at the time and the civil servants treated it as a routine matter, which, given the lack of an export license, it largely is. All part of the political game of course but I think everyone here that is not on the extreme right should be able to see this for the smokescreen it is with the most minimal of research.